Key IG topics in the 3rd quarter of 2024
In August and September 2024, the discussion on internet governance was dominated by the following topics
· The adoption of the Global Digital Compact (GDC) at the UN
· The adoption of the UN Convention against Cybercrime
· The establishment of the new EU Commission and the appointment of the new EU Digital Commissioner
· The presentation of the final report of the UN Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence
· The meeting of the G20 Digital Ministers
· The NATO Cyber Champions Summit
· Political statements on the international digital policy of the USA and Russia
· Re-activation of the technical community’s engagement in internet governance discussions
Global Digital Compact unanimously adopted
On 22 September 2024, the Global Digital Compact was unanimously adopted in New York as an annex to the UN Pact for the Future by 193 heads of state and government. At the last minute, Russia attempted to change the nature of the entire negotiation package, which also includes a declaration on the younger generation, by adding an addendum to the Pact for the Future and making it subject to the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. "We reaffirm that the United Nations shall be driven by intergovernmental decision-making process and that the United Nations and its system shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State", stated the draft resolution, which was supported by five governments (Iran, North Korea, Syria, Nicaragua and Belarus). However, the draft resolution did not receive a majority.
The GDC contains 13 guidelines and defines five goals for the digital future. It requests the digital divide to be overcome. The 2.5 billion people who are still offline should have access to the internet by 2030. Digitalisation should be closely linked to the realisation of human rights. The digital transformation must support the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Data governance and rules for the cross-border flow of data are needed. AI risks should be minimised, opportunities maximised and the emergence of a new North-South AI divide prevented. The GDC includes recommendations on data integrity, cyber security and the development of the digital economy. The guidelines are based on the practices developed since the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2005. There is no reference to the NetMundial conferences (2014 & 2024), in which both principles and procedures for multi-stakeholder cooperation are defined, although such a reference was once included in the interim version (GDC Rev.2). Instead, there is a reference to the phrase "enhanced cooperation", which was included as a compromise formulation in the WSIS Tunis Agenda in 2005 and which reflects the controversy over the role of governments in internet governance.
Those in favour of the GDC described it as a once-in-a-generation opportunity. Critics pointed out that most of the topics discussed at the GDC have been the subject of negotiations within the WSIS process or the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) for years. The GDC negotiations were therefore viewed with suspicion by the internet community. It was feared that the duplication of processes would reduce the resources available to make significant progress in promoting global digital transformation, that the establishment of new institutions would lead to more bureaucracy and less practical action, and that the achievements of the last 20 years, such as the recognition of the multistakeholder principle in the development of global internet policy, would be undermined. Governments more committed to a state-controlled internet could use the GDC negotiations to shift the balance between governments and non-governmental representatives in internet governance in favour of governments.
The final text, which was adopted after numerous revisions, maintains this balance, albeit with very flowery wording. The GDC calls for an "open, global, interoperable, stable and secure Internet" (paragraph 26). The GDC recognises that "Internet governance must continue to be global and multi-stakeholder in nature" (paragraph 27). No new intergovernmental bodies for "digital governance" have been created, as originally intended. The "technical community" is respected as an independent stakeholder. The role of the IGF as the "primary multi-stakeholder platform for discussion of Internet governance issues" (paragraph 28) has been reaffirmed. However, the GDC fails to provide more clarity on the still controversial question of "how" the multistakeholder internet governance model should be practised, i.e. to define the procedures for cooperation between governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, as laid down in the "Sao Paulo Multistakeholder Guidelines" (SPMG) of the NetMundial+10 conference (2024). In this respect, the GDC is not a step forward. But it is not a step backwards either.
Although the IGF was emphasised positively several times in the GDC, which is not unimportant in light of the IGF mandate expiring in 2025, its role was not strengthened. The IGF will continue to be dependent on "voluntary funding" (paragraph 29b). Instead, a new office will be set up for the UN Tech Envoy in New York to support the implementation of the GDC and the UN's AI strategy. In the medium term, this could shift the balance between "New York" and "Geneva" in the further development of a global digital policy. The word "multilateralism" appears 51 times in the UN Pact for the Future and its two annexes, while "multistakeholderism" only appears nine times. The debate between "multilateralism" and "multistakeholderism", between "enhanced intergovernmental cooperation" or "enhanced cooperation between stakeholders", between an "open" or "closed" internet will continue and will determine the discussions at the WSIS+20 process (2025), the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference (2026) and the GDC Review Conference (2027).
The recommendations on artificial intelligence are a new element in the GDC. An "International Scientific Panel on AI" similar to the International Climate Council is to be established. A global "Policy Dialogue on AI Governance" is to take place twice a year within the UN and its specialised agencies such as the ITU and UNESCO. And the new GDC office of the UN Tech Envoy is also to deal with AI. The GDC has thus already implemented some of the recommendations of the UN's AI Expert Group, which presented its final report in New York at almost the same time as the GDC was adopted. The UN Tech Envoy was a member of the UN AI Expert Group. It is interesting to note that AI in the GDC is closely linked to the topic of internet governance and data governance and that a general reference is made to WSIS, and thus also to the Tunis Agenda's definition of internet governance. This will help shape future debates on "Governance in the Digital Age" (internet governance, IOT governance, cyber governance, digital governance, ICT governance, AI governance, etc.).
The "follow-up" of the GDC was also controversial until the end. Little has remained of the numerous proposals for new institutions and processes. It was only agreed to organise a GDC review conference in 2027 as part of the 82nd UN General Assembly. The modalities of this review conference are to be determined by an intergovernmental body in 2026. The question of whether and how non-governmental stakeholders will be involved is unclear. Russia in particular has repeatedly criticised the multistakeholder approach. Both the Pact for the Future and the GDC are not binding under international law, but rather political recommendations that are intended to provide governments and stakeholders with guidelines for their actions.
Final draft for UN convention against cybercrime
On 8 August 2024, the Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) in New York agreed on a final text for a UN convention against cybercrime.
The idea goes back to a proposal made by Russia in 2019. Since then, an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) under the 3rd Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) responsible for human rights issues has been negotiating such an agreement alternately in Vienna and New York. The damage caused by cyber criminals runs into the hundreds of billions of dollars every year. In particular, attacks using blackmail software (ransomware) have more than doubled in the last two years.
The Western countries had originally proposed that all UN member states join the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. This treaty was negotiated by the Council of Europe in 2001 and is open to all UN member states. It regulates very precisely what constitutes a criminal offence in cyberspace and how law enforcement authorities can cooperate across national borders. Emerging issues can be addressed through the negotiation of additional protocols, which has already happened twice. However, countries of the global South, such as India and South Africa, complained that they were not included in the drafting of the Budapest Convention. They therefore supported the Russian proposal to develop a universal UN instrument. The Budapest Convention now has over 70 members, including African and Latin American countries such as Brazil. However, this is only a third of the UN membership. This is an indirect invitation to cyber criminals to seek "safe havens".
From the outset, the definition of criminal offences in cyberspace and ensuring the rule of law in cross-border criminal prosecution were contentious issues in the AHC negotiations.
Russia and China wanted to expand the catalogue of criminal offences beyond the intrusion and manipulation of networks (intrusion & hacking) and, for example, introduce the dissemination of terrorist and illegal information on the internet as cyber crime. The West, on the other hand, rejected a general criminalisation of the dissemination of information content on the internet. This was already reflected in the dispute over the title of the treaty. While the Western countries argued in favour of a "UN Convention against Cybercrime", Russia wanted the title of the treaty to include the phrase "Use of IT technology to commit criminal offences". In the end, a title with a subtitle was agreed upon. The official name of the convention is now: "United Nations convention against cybercrime: Strengthening international cooperation for combating certain crimes committed by means of information and communications technology systems and for the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crimes."
The West's main concern with the procedures for prosecution in cyberspace was to include guarantees for the protection of human rights in the treaty. The fight against cyber criminals must not lead to the erosion of fundamental freedoms and human rights such as the right to freedom of expression or the protection of privacy. Law enforcement authorities must adhere to constitutional procedures. Whistleblowers, journalists and scientists, the so-called "white hackers" who check networks and databases for vulnerabilities and then report them, thereby increasing cyber security, should also be protected. And cross-border requests from law enforcement authorities must be transparent.
The result is a treaty based on the lowest common denominator. The definitions are vague, the safeguards are weak and it remains to be seen how the agreed procedures will be used or abused when the agreement comes into force, which may take several years.
From the outset, the negotiations were criticised by civil society and the business community. In the eyes of non-governmental observers, the convention was considered to do little to reduce cyber crime, but instead give authoritarian states the opportunity to legitimise censorship and surveillance by invoking international law. Nick Ashton-Hart, who accompanied the negotiations for the "Tech Accord", a business association of over 100 internet companies, called the treaty a misconstruction in a Lawfare podcast. In a statement dated 16 September 2024, the Advisory Board of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) recommended rejecting the new treaty.
The approval of the final text by the Western governments at the August meeting of the AHC was not least a concession to the countries of the Global South. The Group of 77 pushed for adoption and would have forced a majority decision if necessary. Close cooperation with the Global South plays a major role in the international cyber and digital strategy adopted by the USA in May 2024, which states the principle of "digital solidarity" as its top priority. The reason behind this is that these so-called "swing states" should not be driven into the hands of China or Russia on the global stage.
The convention must be adopted by the upcoming 79th UN General Assembly in autumn 2024. If the corresponding resolution receives a majority, the convention can be opened for signature. It will enter into force as soon as the 40th instrument of ratification has been deposited. Only then will it become clear whether the expectations of this convention to drastically reduce cyber crime will be fulfilled. If not, the Budapest Convention will continue to offer an alternative with a probably more effective set of instruments.
Bis hier gelesen und Änderungen eingepflegt, noch keine Rechtschreibprüfung
The new EU Digital Commissioner and her tasks
On 16 September 2024, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced her proposals for the composition of the new EU Commission. Former Finnish minister Henna Virkkunen is to become the new EU Digital Commissioner. Virkkunen will bear the title "Executive Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy" and thus be one of the deputies of the EU Commission President.
Her tasks were specified in a so-called "mission letter" by the EU Commission President. Von der Leyen describes the digital transformation as a centrepiece of the EU Commission's work in the coming legislative period. The two reports by former Italian Prime Ministers Enrico Letta (May 2024) and Mario Draghi (September 2024) are intended to provide strategic orientation for this digital transformation. The focus will be on implementing the EU's "Digital Decade" by 2030, including the implementation of the EU's AI strategy, digital innovation and the drafting of new laws on the cloud and digital networks. Henna Virkunnen will also be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the laws adopted in recent years — GDPR, DSA, DMA, AI Act, Chips Act, Media Freedom Act, NIS2, etc. Other fields of responsibility will include cyber security and the fight against disinformation, as well as the "digital hubs", which aim to improve digital cooperation with the global South. On top of that, her tasks comprise the development of an EU plan for quantum chips and a strategy for a "European Data Union". The topic of internet governance naturally also falls within her remit. For the first time, a Digital Commissioner will head two Directorates-General simultaneously: DG Connect and DG Digit.
According to von der Leyen's vision, the new EU Commission should work more as a "college" and operate across departments. At least six other Commissioners will also have indirect responsibilities for future EU digital policy. Teresa Ribera, another Executive Vice-President, for Competitive Transition, Stéphane Séjourné, also Executive Vice-President, for Industrial Strategy, Roxana Mînzatu for Skills and Education, Ekaterina Zaharieva for Start-ups, Research and Innovation, Andrius Kubilius for Defence and Katja Kalles for Foreign Affairs. The proposed Commissioners will have to face a questioning by the European Parliament in the next weeks. The new Commissioners can only take office once the Parliament has given its approval.
Artificial intelligence continues to be the subject of intense debate
Artificial intelligence remains high on the agenda of global politics and the UN in particular. Both the UN Pact for the Future and the Global Digital Compact include demands for global AI governance. A new UN Council for Artificial Intelligence (modelled on the UN Climate Council) is to be created by 2024. A new AI dialogue is to take place twice a year as part of existing UN events. A new AI office will be established at the UN Tech Envoy. On 20 September 2024, the UN AI Expert Group appointed by UN Secretary-General Guterres in 2022 presented its final report "Governing AI for Humanity". Further AI initiatives were launched on the margins of the UN Future Summit and the 79th UN General Assembly.
The UN report "Governing AI for Humanity" describes AI as one of the greatest challenges facing humanity in the coming years. It says that AI offers huge opportunities to solve global problems and contribute to achieving the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. However, AI is also associated with incalculable risks.
The report contains seven recommendations. "1. an international scientific panel on AI; 2. policy dialogue on AI governance; 3. AI standards exchange; 4. AI capacity development network; 5. global fund for AI, 6. global AI data framework, 7. AI office within the UN Secretariat". Three of these recommendations (AI panel, AI dialogue and AI office) have already been implemented in the Global Digital Compact. The UN Tech Envoy, Amandeep Singh Gil, was a member of the AI Council. The member of the Bundestag of the German party Alliance 90/The Greens, Anna Christian, sat on this UN AI Expert Council for Germany.
The report criticises the fragmentation of the discussion on AI governance that has grown in recent years. It mentions a total of seven politically relevant processes (OECD AI Principles/2019, G20 AI Principles/2019, Council of Europe AI Convention/2024, GPAI Ministerial Declaration/2022, G7 Hiroshima AI Process/2023, Bletchley Declaration/2023 and Seoul AI Ministerial Declaration/2024), in which the 193 UN member states are involved in very different ways. Only seven countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the USA and the UK) are present everywhere. 118 countries are not involved in any of the initiatives mentioned. The report warns of a new "AI divide" and a monopolisation and concentration of future political and economic AI processes. The Council calls for all countries, especially developing countries, to be equally involved in the implementation of its recommendations.
In addition to the UN report, there were numerous new AI initiatives on the fringes of the UN Summit of the Future and the UN General Assembly in New York:
On 22 September 2024, the OECD and the UN agreed on closer cooperation on AI. The OECD had already adopted basic principles for AI governance in 2019 and launched the Global Partnership for Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) in 2022. OECD Deputy Secretary-General Ulrik Vestergaard Knudsen hopes that expanded cooperation will extend the scope of the GPAI to all 193 UN members. UN Tech Envoy Amandeep Singh Gil hopes to benefit from the expertise of the OECD AI Observatory. Gil said: "We will work with all stakeholders, including leading scientists and academic centres from around the globe".
On 27 September 2024, the Chinese government launched a new AI initiative in New York entitled "AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All" . The three-page paper proposes five general principles for global AI development (1. Promote AI and Digital Infrastructure Connectivity; 2. Empower Industries Through the AI Plus Application; 3. Enhance AI Literacy and Strengthen Personnel Training; 4. Improve AI Data Security and Diversity; 5. Ensure AI Safety, Reliability and Controllability). In ten points, it offers China's active participation in the future shaping of global AI governance. The action plan ties in with UN Resolution 78/311 on AI, which was also tabled by China at the 78th UN General Assembly. It is aimed in particular at closer cooperation with the Global South and offers developing countries the help of Chinese companies in AI developments. The Chinese AI action plan makes no reference to the Global Digital Compact or the report of the UN Commission of Experts on AI. The paper avoids terms such as "multistakeholder" and "human rights". It advocates "multi-party coordination and cooperation ... based on the principles of sovereign equality, development orientation, people centred, shared benefits and inclusiveness". Representatives from 80 countries took part in the seminar in New York, including Serbia's Prime Minister Vučić. China's Foreign Minister Wang announced plans to organise ten AI workshops in developing countries in 2025 and to form a "Group of Friends of International Cooperation in AI Capacity Building".
In a joint statement dated 23 September 2024, the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) spoke out on the current global AI discussions. It appeals to the responsibility of all stakeholders to put AI developments at the service of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the realisation of human rights. "With the unprecedented exploration and adoption of AI tools, it is time for governments to adopt responsible and human rights-respecting AI practices and policies". Seven guidelines are proposed. "1. Respect International Obligations and Commitments; 2. Assess Impacts of AI Systems in High-Risk; 3. Conduct ongoing monitoring of AI systems in high-impact contexts throughout their use: 4. Ensure adequate human training and assessment; 5. Communicate and Respond to the Public; 6. Provide Effective Access to Remedy; 7. Procure Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI".
On 13 September 2024, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change in Oxford published a critical study on the planned AI regulation in the UK. A British AI law must promote innovation and expand the UK's global leadership role in AI safety. The existing regulatory authorities such as OFCOM are underfunded and do not have the necessary expertise. However, given the speed and uncertainty with which the technology is developing, the government should not reinvent the wheel, but rather close the gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure and provide more resources instead of creating a new overarching AI regulator. "Too much, too soon" regulation could stifle innovation.
G20 Digital Ministers call for digital inclusion for all
The annual meeting of the G20 Digital Ministers took place in Maceió, Brazil, on 13 September. The "G20 Maceió Ministerial Declaration on Digital Inclusion for All" evokes the importance "of building safety, resilience, security and trust and creating an enabling, inclusive, open, fair, non-discriminatory, safe, secure and sustainable digital economy that puts humans and their development at the centre and enables the protection, promotion and full enjoyment of human rights.". However, no concrete resolutions were passed.
The discussion centred on improving "universal and meaningful connectivity" for the global South. High costs and a lack of education were cited as the main obstacles to progress. The "G20 Guidelines on Indicators and Metrics for Universal and Meaningful Connectivity", developed by the ITU and the Brazilian G20 presidency, were adopted as a tool to help close the "connectivity gap". The ITU also wants to help implement the "G20 Digital Infrastructure Investment Initiative" (DI³).
A second topic was the promotion of the "Digital Public Infrastructure" (DPI). One of the tasks of this initiative is to develop comparable procedures for digital identification. The G20 Digital Minister Meeting adopted the "G20 General Principles on the Governance of Digital Identity, which were developed in cooperation with the OECD. The document contains twelve very general principles, including technology neutrality, the use of open source software and data protection. Digital identification systems should be "user-centred, sustainable and inclusive" and comply with human rights.
The topic of fake news and disinformation was discussed, too. It was warned of public debates being polarised in societies and the occurrence of monopolisation in the hands of a few service providers. The G20 Digital Ministers called upon digital platforms to fulfil their responsibility and bring more transparency to their publication and deletion practices. In their opinion, more needs to be done for "information integrity". No concrete measures were decided, however.
In the discussion on artificial intelligence, no resolutions were passed either. Reference was made to the relevant UN processes, the G20 AI principles from 2019 and the UNESCO recommendation on AI and ethics (2023). The Ministers expressed their support for "risk-based and human-centric, development-oriented, innovation-friendly AI policy and governance approaches that are consistent with applicable legal frameworks on security, privacy and protection of personal data, human rights and intellectual property rights".
The G20 Digital Ministers renewed the mandate of the G20 Digital Economy Working Group (DEWG), which was established under the German G20 presidency in 2017. South Africa will take over the G20 presidency in 2025.
Discussion about autonomous weapons systems continues
The discussion about internet-based autonomous weapons systems (AWS) gained further momentum in Q3 2024, not least due to the use of such weapons in the war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East.
For ten years, the issue has been negotiated in a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE LAWS) under the umbrella of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva, albeit without any recognisable progress. Another round of negotiations took place in August 2024. The only result to date is the agreement reached in 2019 on general guidelines. There is still no agreement on the objective of the negotiations and the definition of autonomous weapons systems. A majority of states are calling for a ban under international law in the form of an additional protocol to the CCW Convention (similar to the ban on landmines). The USA, Israel, Turkey, China, Russia and other states are in favour of a non-binding recommendation under international law. The dispute over the definition of AWS is fundamentally about the control of the use of AWS by a person (who can also be held responsible). A number of European states, including Germany, are in favour of a differentiated approach: a ban under international law on weapons systems that are beyond human control and political recommendations for the use of AWS under the control of military personnel.
Due to the lack of progress in the GGE LAWS negotiations, the Austrian government submitted a draft resolution to the UN in 2023 and asked UN Secretary-General Guterres for an AWS report to be discussed at the 79th UN General Assembly in 2024. The report, with comments from over 50 governments, was published on 7 August 2024. NGOs such as "Stop Killer Robots" have welcomed the report and expect the UN General Assembly to come up with a concrete plan on how to proceed. UN Secretary-General Guterres has been advocating a moratorium on these weapons for years and is campaigning for a corresponding treaty to be negotiated by 2026. He received support from Pope Francis in May 2024, who also called for a ban on these weapons in a speech to the heads of state and government of the G7 countries in Apulia. Austria will organise a workshop on this topic at IGF in Riyadh in December 2024.
NATO Cyber Champions Summit warns of developments in cyber attacks
This year's NATO Cyber Champions Summit (CCS) took place in Sydney on 5 September 2024. James Appathurai, NATO Deputy Secretary General for Hybrid Warfare and Cyber, warned of an increase in cyber attacks and called for NATO to develop a higher level of deterrence against threats in cyberspace. The position of "cyber general" was only newly created in the NATO service structure in 2021. NATO's Cyber Champions Summit is intended to bring together the military, business, technical community and other stakeholders in order to better assess current political and military challenges in cyberspace. It was first organised in Lithuania in 2023. Korea will host the event in 2025.
Digital policy in the USA
On the eve of the 79th UN General Assembly, US Cyber Ambassador Nataniel Fick gave a briefing on the US government's priorities in cyberspace. He said that the US government is increasingly realising "that technology is playing an ever greater role in all areas of foreign policy. It is a thread that runs through all of our bilateral relationships around the world, through our multilateral relationships and multilateral forums of all sizes and compositions, and through all functional issues from climate change to human rights to scientific research. Technology is central."
At a White House Roundtable on U.S. Leadership in AI Infrastructure on 12 September 2024 at the White House in Washington, the US government discussed the US AI strategy with leading business representatives, including Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, Brad Smith, President of Microsoft, Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia and senior representatives of Google, Amazon, Facebook and other US tech companies. They agreed to establish a new "Task Force on AI Datacenter Infrastructure to coordinate policy across government".
In a speech to the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) on 26 September 2024 in New York, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken invited countries in the Global South to join the FOC. He referred to the FOC statement on AI and announced that US$ 33 million would be made available for AI developments in developing countries. Blinken made it clear that a multi-stakeholder approach is also essential for AI governance. "We know, as with virtually everything else we do, when we’re doing it together, when we join forces — and not just among governments but with the private sector, with civil society, and NGOs — there’s nothing we can’t get done, if we share the determination to do it and do it together". Mr Blinken referred to the FOC's achievements in curbing digital surveillance by formulating guidelines for the use of surveillance technologies by governments. The FOC has spoken out against the misuse of commercial espionage programs and is a place for the exchange of experience in combating disinformation.
On 3 September 2024, the US government adopted a "Roadmap to Enhancing Internet Routing Security". It thus implemented a measure of the US cyber security strategy adopted in 2023. The starting point was the consideration that the 80,000 or so autonomous systems (ASs) that make up the internet harbour security risks. These networks are quite diverse in terms of purpose, business models, customers served, geographic size, speed, number of connected devices and internal network technologies. The roadmap attempts to respond to this and minimise security risks. "This document serves as a roadmap to increase the adoption of technologies that address critical vulnerabilities associated with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and drive improvements in Internet inter-domain routing security and resilience. This roadmap is not a technical guide on how to implement routing, but rather points to best-available guidance and practices, details United States Government (USG) actions to promote BGP security, and makes recommendations to improve routing security throughout the Internet ecosystem."
Digital policy in Russia
In speeches to the UN General Assembly and the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New York at the end of September 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made negative comments about the UN Pact for the Future. In particular, he criticised references to the multistakeholder approach and the "excessive involvement of a priori biased NGOs in the intergovernmental process". This would undermine the basis of the UN as an intergovernmental organisation. He accused the USA of wanting to control the internet worldwide.
On 11 September 2024, the annual conference of the Russian Association for Networks and Services (RANS) took place in Moscow under the title "State and Prospects of Development of ICT Infrastructure". The CEO of the Russian ccTLD registry Andrey Vorobyev reported on this year's Russian IGF and emphasised that the technical community must play a leading role in internet governance. "It is important to maintain the leading role of the technical community in Internet Governance." Russian Digital Ministry spokesperson Natalia Babekina is quoted as saying: "Modern challenges, such as the militarisation of virtual space and the growth of cyber threats, emphasise the need for effective international regulation. It is important that the role of states in the multistakeholder model of Internet Governance is implemented not only on the books, but also in practice."
In response to a Russian journalist asking whether digital platforms such as "You Tube" in Russia could not be nationalised in order to turn them into "RuTube", Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Andrey Nastasyin responded in Moscow on 31 July 2024 with the accusation that the USA was establishing a "global digital dictatorship". Russia had sent over 60,000 requests to the platforms to delete texts hostile to Russia. All had been ignored. The West must stop applying double standards when interpreting freedom of information. The platforms must respect Russian legislation. "Digital sovereignty is an inalienable part of Russia's security. It is necessary to accelerate efforts to ensure the self-sufficiency of the Russian segment of the internet and the entire ecosystem of web services."
Technical Community Coalition on Multistakeholderism helps shape future internet governance
The "Technical Community Coalition on Multistakeholderism" (TCCM), which was founded on 7 June 2024, has issued further statements on the current disputes regarding internet governance. At the end of September 2024, the TCCM already had 22 members, primarily registries of top level domains (TLDs). The TCCM sees itself as an association of technical operators from around the world who are committed to a further developed and strengthened multistakeholder approach to internet governance in order to keep the internet open, free, global, secure, resilient and interoperable for all. Their goal is to critically accompany political processes such as GDC or WSIS+20.
In August 2024, the TCCM intervened in the final negotiations on the GDC with two statements. On 7 August 2024, the TCCM uttered criticism regarding the procedure for drafting the GDC and complained that the role of non-governmental representatives in the negotiation process was unclear and needed to be clarified. On 23 August 2024, a position was taken on the GDC Rev.3. It states: "We would also like to join many other stakeholders in cautioning against new multilateral initiatives proposed by the GDC that would duplicate existing work, and to once again call for the bolstering of existing multistakeholder initiatives including those created through the WSIS outcomes, in particular the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). We continue to believe that the IGF should remain the primary multi-stakeholder dialogue about the Internet and play a key role in the implementation and follow-up on the GDC. It is only through regular and meaningful involvement of all stakeholder groups in the Compact's development that we can successfully achieve its stated goal of "shared principles for an open, free and secure digital future for all".
On 2 September 2024, the TCCM issued a statement on the upcoming meeting of the ITU-CWG-Internet. In recent years, the CWG-Internet has repeatedly been the scene of disputes over the creation of alternative oversight models for the management of domain names and IP addresses. Russia in particular has repeatedly proposed a discussion on the role of governments in ICANN in this working group, most recently in January 2024. In its statement on the next CWG-Internet meeting of the ITU in Geneva at the beginning of October 2024, TCCM says: "The multi-stakeholder approach fosters diversity, accountability and transparency that cannot be replicated in intergovernmental environments alone. It also ensures that decision-making about the Internet and its governance isn't led by individual nation-based political interests. The multi-stakeholder approach is the appropriate model to govern the Internet".
Other technical bodies are also beginning to take a stronger stance on political issues relating to internet governance. For example, the World Organization of Electrical Engineers (IEEE) has established a "Research Group on Issues of Autonomy and AI in Defense Systems". The focus of this group is to create a knowledge base of best practices for the development, deployment and management of autonomous weapons systems. These practices will initially be based on the guidelines established by the AWS Principles and will later be updated to reflect evolving technological advances and international standards and regulations. Proposed outputs of this Industry Connections activity may include documents (e.g. white papers, reports), proposals for standards, conferences and workshops, etc.
