Developments in the internet governance environment April to June 2026

Wolfgang Kleinwächter Jul 13, 2026 23 min read

In the second quarter of 2026, the debate on internet governance was dominated by two topics:

The future of the IGF and the new WSIS architecture (WSIS+)
The search for global arrangements for artificial intelligence

The issue of cyber security will return to the forefront in the third quarter of 2026. In July 2026, the first meeting of the new ‘Global Mechanism for Cyber Security’[1] will take place in New York. In September 2026, the GGE on LAWS (autonomous weapon systems) will meet in Geneva for its final session[2]. The issue of digital human rights will also play a role in the third quarter of 2026. The UN Human Rights Council will be in session in Geneva until 17 July 2026, during which it will, amongst other things, discuss a report on ‘Human rights and new and emerging digital technologies’[3]. Discussions have already begun in preparation for the ITU General Assembly, due to take place in the fourth quarter of 2026, which may once again address the future of the management of critical internet resources.[4]

I. The future of the IGF and the new WSIS architecture (WSIS+)

In implementing the decision of the 80th UN General Assembly to grant the Internet Governance Forum permanent status within the UN system, the first steps towards shaping the future of the IGF were taken in the second quarter of 2026. This concerned, in particular, the Expert Group Meeting (EGM) in New York in April 2026 and the first open consultations of the new IGF Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) in Nairobi at the end of June 2026.

IGF reforms: EGM report calls for strategic reorientation and new policy networks

On 7 May 2026, the IGF Secretariat published the EGM report containing 68 recommendations. The report focuses on measures to enhance the IGF’s policy relevance and to integrate the IGF more closely with other global digital policy processes both within and outside the UN system.

To enhance the IGF’s political relevance, it is recommended that it move towards longer-term planning and strengthen its so-called ‘inter-sessional’ work. There is a call for “a more strategic and coherent framework to guide its work, including a multi-year perspective that aligns its various components across the ecosystem”, aimed at “more actionable and policy-relevant outputs”, whilst retaining the IGF’s core principle of not being a negotiating body. Even before the New York meeting, the IGF Secretariat had called for proposals on future priorities. From over 60 proposals, four topics – artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital inclusion and infrastructure development – were selected to be addressed by four new “IGF Policy Networks”. These replace the previous Policy Networks (PNs) and Best Practice Forums (BPFs). These four networks are thus effectively elevated to the status of an IGF sub-organisation with a mandate to produce policy-relevant output. The work of the more than 30 Dynamic Coalitions (DCs) and the more than 170 national and regional IGFs (NRIs) is to be strengthened, as are the various tracks for parliamentarians, judges and young people.
I. On the contentious issue of the role of governments within the IGF, the EGM recommended organising a ‘Government Dialogue’ rather than introducing a new, separate government track. ‘Rather than a new track, enhanced government engagement, termed “Government Dialogue”, could be an adaptation of existing formats, such as the high-level track and Day 0 ministerial-style engagements organised by IGF host countries.’ The concern is that a separate government meeting could, in the long term, alter the nature of the IGF, transforming the multi-stakeholder IGF into an intergovernmental internet organisation with a negotiating mandate. Several governments had repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, advocated for this model since 2005 in the UNCSTD Working Groups on “Enhanced Cooperation” (WGEC). During the WSIS+20 negotiations in December 2025, a flexible formulation was agreed upon which, on the one hand, grants governments an important role in the IGF dialogue, whilst at the same time calling on them to intensify their own dialogue with non-state stakeholders.
When linking up with other processes relating to global digital policy, it is particularly recommended to coordinate with the WSIS follow-up, the Global Digital Compact (GDC), the ‘Global Dialogue on AI Governance’ and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in order to avoid duplication of effort, as called for in the WSIS+20 Output Document. The GDC is due to be reviewed in 2027, and the SDGs in 2030. It remains to be seen, for the time being, how this coordination is to be put into practice. At the EURODIG in Brussels on 26 May 2026, the proposal was included in the ‘EURODIG Messages from Brussels’[5] to initially establish ‘non-voting liaisons’ between the 40-member IGF Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) and the 40-member UN Independent AI Panel, in order to improve the flow of information between the two bodies: “EuroDIG considers it important to resolve confusion about AI governance by promoting cooperation between Internet governance and AI processes, and specifically proposes the appointment of liaisons between the IGF MAG and the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI established by WSIS+20”.

The new MAG and preparations for the 21st IGF in Nairobi

In April 2026, the UN Deputy Secretary-General, Li Junhua, appointed the members of the new IGF Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG). The new Chair of the MAG is Jennifer Chung from Hong Kong, China, Vice-President of Dot Asia. Chung had previously served as Co-Chair of the Informal Multistakeholder Sounding Board (IMSB) in the WSIS+20 process. The first IGF-MAG consultations to prepare for the 21st IGF (December 2026 in Nairobi) took place in Nairobi from 24 to 26 June 2026.

Kenyan Ambassador Abraham Korir Sing’Oei, who is also co-chair of the MAG, had proposed “Governing the Future of Intelligence” as the overarching theme for the Nairobi conference[6]. The discussion centred on the word “Governing”. Some MAG members viewed the term critically, as it could signal too close an association with “government” and thus undermine the balance of the multi-stakeholder model. There were also critical discussions regarding “intelligence”, which also refers to secret services and espionage. Questions were raised as to whether the CIA, NSA, FSB, Mossad and other intelligence agencies should then also be invited. The final decision on the theme and the resulting sub-themes – with sovereignty, trust and the open Internet proposed – is to be taken at the next virtual MAG meeting in early July 2026.
The MAG agreed on the roadmap for the Nairobi conference. The deadline for submitting proposals for workshops is 31 July 2026. The evaluation of the proposals is to be completed by the time of the 2nd Open IGF-MAG Consultations (early September 2026, Geneva). The programme is due to be finalised by 19 October 2026. The IGF will then take place in Nairobi from 14 to 18 December 2026.[7]
The idea of establishing ‘liaison’ arrangements between the MAGs and other UN bodies, in particular with the new UN panel on AI, is to be discussed at a later date.

New WSIS architecture: strengthening UNGIS and a roadmap for GDC implementation

The WSIS+20 Outcome Document, adopted by the 80th UN General Assembly, has, amongst other things, strengthened the role of the UN Group on the Information Society (UNGIS), which was established in 2005. UNGIS is a network comprising 31 UN organisations and 21 observers, which addresses various aspects of the development of the information society. According to the WSIS+20 Review, UNGIS is “the principal inter-agency mechanism coordinating substantive policy issues for the implementation of WSIS“[8]. Within the new WSIS architecture, UNGIS complements the UNCSTD, which is responsible for implementing the WSIS recommendations and is required to submit a WSIS progress report to the UN General Assembly via ECOSOC every two years. The UNGIS Secretariat, based in Geneva, is headed by the ITU.

As UN organisations are intergovernmental organisations, critics view a strengthening of UNGIS as a strengthening of the role of governments, which could be at the expense of non-state stakeholders within a multi-stakeholder governance model. The proposal put forward during the WSIS+20 negotiations to supplement UNGIS with a Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG@UNGIS), did not secure a majority in New York in December 2025, but was reflected in the recommendation in the WSIS+20 Output Document calling on UNGIS “to enhance its agility, efficiency and effectiveness and expand its membership to include further United Nations entities, with a view to fostering multi-stakeholder dialogue, partnership-building and a review of progress on digital cooperation.” At the instigation of the ITU, UNGIS has now decided, on 14 May 2026, to establish a Multistakeholder Consultation Group (MCG) for UNGIS.[9] The MCG “is created to provide a platform for consultation and engagement between UNGIS and all stakeholder communities — governments, the private sector, civil society, the technical community, academia and international organisations”. It is to consist of 15 to 20 members from all stakeholder groups, meet three times a year for virtual meetings and hold an annual face-to-face meeting during the WSIS Forum in Geneva.
On 20 April 2026, UNGIS presented a “Joint Implementation Road Map for WSIS & GDC Coherence“[10] to the 29th session of the UNCSTD in Geneva. The UNCSTD is responsible for implementing the WSIS resolutions. The road map is intended to ensure coordination between the implementation of the WSIS resolutions and the recommendations of the Global Digital Compact (GDC). The WSIS+20 Output Document had warned of the risks of duplication of activities. Based on the “WSIS Process and 2030 Agenda–GDC Matrix“[11] from December 2024, the roadmap specifies individual activities and aims to ensure that there is no overlap between the WSIS action lines and the implementation of the GDC. The review of the GDC is scheduled for the 82nd UN General Assembly in autumn 2027.

II. Global discussion platforms on AI governance

The debate on artificial intelligence continues to expand and is increasingly becoming a central issue in international digital diplomacy. At political summits, there is less and less discussion of internet governance and a ‘free, open and interoperable Internet’. AI governance is taking centre stage. However, it remains unclear exactly what ‘AI governance’ means. Many stakeholders interpret it as ‘regulation’, although there are differing approaches here. Whilst the EU has set standards with its AI Act, the US under the Trump administration rejects AI regulation. In Trump’s AI action plan ‘Winning the AI Race’ from July 2025, any form of AI governance is described as a bureaucratic burden that stifles innovation. However, in light of recent technical developments – particularly following the escalating disputes over the Anthropic Myth in the second quarter of 2026 – more nuanced positions are also emerging in the US, as demonstrated by the new “Executive Order (EO) Promoting Advanced AI Innovation and Security” published by President Trump on 3 June 2026[12]. Even within the traditional internet governance community, such as the IGF or ICANN, AI is increasingly shaping the debates, as demonstrated by the ICANN meeting in Seville (June 2026) and the IGF-MAG consultations in Nairobi (June 2026). The discussion received a significant boost from Pope Leo XIV, who, on 25 May 2026, addressed the topic of AI at length in his encyclical ‘Magnifica Humanitas: On the Protection of Humanity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence’[13] and also set out demands for the diplomatic community.

Conceptual differences: The difficult link between Internet and AI governance

It remains unclear how internet governance and AI governance are linked. For internet governance, there is a definition accepted by the international community in the 2005 WSIS Tunis Agenda, which was reaffirmed in the WSIS+20 Output Document in December 2025. There is as yet no definition of AI governance. When comparing internet governance and AI governance, there are two approaches:

One group, which has its roots primarily in the Internet community, argues that without the Internet there would be no AI and that, therefore, fundamental governance principles such as multistakeholderism, a holistic approach, accountability, transparency, openness, interoperability, inclusion, multilingualism, bottom-up policy development, etc., which were developed over 20 years ago for global Internet management and specified in the 2014 NetMundial Declaration, essentially apply to AI governance as well, although there are, of course, new problems and challenges that in practice require a further development of the principles of Internet governance. When seeking guidelines for AI governance, it is therefore not necessary to reinvent the wheel. The aim should be to build on what already exists.
The other group, which has its roots more firmly in the business and tech communities as well as in the academic communities of computer science and mathematics, views AI governance as a new phenomenon for which new principles must be developed. On the Internet, there are critical resources such as domain names and IP addresses that require coordinated management. The critical resources for AI are data and algorithms, but these cannot be compared to the DNS. By their very nature, they elude global coordination. The discussion is further accelerated by the rapid pace of innovation with which new AI applications are appearing on the market and creating new problems, as the recent debate surrounding the Anthropic Myth has shown. Particularly in the US, a community has developed around new tech companies – now worth billions – such as Nvidia, Anthropic, OpenAI, etc., which have little connection to the development of the Internet in the 1990s and early 2000s or to the philosophies of the Internet’s founding fathers and mothers.
To date, there are few links between internet governance and AI governance. In the UN’s new 40-member Independent AI Panel, there are no internet experts represented apart from the co-chair Maria Ressa, who was also co-chair of the IGF Leadership Panel. Conversely, the same applies to the 40 members of the new IGF MAG, although a Policy Network on Artificial Intelligence (PNAI) has been active under the MAG since 2023. The EURODIG proposal from May 2026 to exchange non-voting liaisons between the two bodies is on the table, but requires further discussion.

Fragmentation of the debate: The search for global AI regulation

It is also unclear where the politically and economically relevant discussions are taking place. At present, there is widespread fragmentation and growing uncertainty about who is responsible for what and which rules should apply at national, regional and/or global level.

As was the case in the 1990s with the development of the Internet, it is becoming apparent that AI developers are moving faster than politicians. The difference is that, in the 1990s, the development of the Internet was largely ignored by governments. Regulation of the Internet was rejected in the 1990s. Today, more and more governments are engaging with AI development. With a few exceptions, AI regulation is viewed positively.
The debate on AI regulation had already begun in the second half of the 2010s, initially within the OECD and later at UNESCO. In the 2020s, the EU has pioneered the field with its AI Act. Against the backdrop of the AI race between the US, China, the EU and the Global South (particularly India and Africa), different philosophies regarding AI regulation have emerged. At a global level, increasing fragmentation can be observed.
In recent years, seven AI discussion platforms have emerged, which have so far had little connection with one another:

The OECD’s Global Partnership on AI (GPAI)[14],
the Hiroshima AI Prozess (HAIP), launched by the G7 countries in 2024 under the Japanese presidency,[15]
the so-called Bletchley Prozess, launched by the UK government in 2023 - that is, the annual AI summits involving selected governments and industry representatives,[16]
the UN with its Independent International Panel on AI and the Global Dialogue on AI Governance,[17]
initiatives from the ‘Global South’[18], in particular from India, some Arab countries and the African Union[19],
the proposal put forward by China to establish a new non-governmental world organisation for AI (WAICO)[20], as well as Russia’s activities,
the encyclical ‘Magnifica Humanitas. On the Protection of Humanity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence’ published by Pope Leo XIV.

The OECD’s Global Partnership on AI (GPAI)

The OECD was the first international intergovernmental organisation to address AI in the second half of the 2010s. In 2019, the OECD Ministerial Council adopted a document setting out five fundamental principles for dealing with AI (inclusive growth, sustainable development and well-being; human rights and democratic values, including fairness and privacy; transparency and explainability; robustness, security and safety; and accountability) and issued five policy recommendations (Investing in AI research and development; fostering an inclusive AI-enabling ecosystem; shaping an enabling, interoperable governance and policy environment for AI; building human capacity and preparing for labour market transformation; and international co-operation to , trustworthy AI).[21] The legally non-binding OECD principles received the support of the heads of state and government of the G20 countries at the 2019 G20 Summit in Osaka.[22] The five principles played a key role in the drafting of the EU’s AI Act (2024)[23], the drafting of the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence[24] (2021) and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law[25] (2024), the first international treaty on AI.
Based on the OECD AI Principles, the OECD established an ‘AI Observatory’[26] in 2020 to monitor and document AI developments around the world. The Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) was also launched that same year, initially with 15 members. In 2024, the OECD adopted a revised version of the OECD AI Principles, adapted to meet new challenges. The GPAI subsequently reorganised itself. By 2026, it had 47 members, including numerous key players from the Global South such as India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia. The GPAI has three offices in Montreal, Paris and Seoul. Numerous working groups operate under the umbrella of the GPAI.
Despite the GPAI’s efforts to engage globally, many developing countries, particularly in Africa, harbour reservations about the GPAI. They view the GPAI primarily as an instrument dominated by Western states that pays too little attention to the specific interests of developing countries. They fear ‘digital neo-colonialism’. The OECD rejects this and points to the openness of its instruments. Among the GPAI’s notable achievements are the OECD.AI Policy Navigator[27], the OECD.AI Catalogue of Tools and Metrics for Trustworthy AI, and the OECD.AI Policy Toolkit[28].
At the most recent meeting of the GPAI Ministerial Councils in February 2026 in New Delhi, the ministers present acknowledged the GPAI’s growing relevance and invited further states to participate. They described the GPAI as an important “bridge between research and AI policy development”. They referred to the G7’s Hiroshima Process (HAIP) and acknowledged the outcomes of the AI Summit in New Delhi as a continuation of the Bletchley Process, but made no mention of UN activities or the African and Chinese proposals.

G7 Hiroshima Artificial Intelligence Process (HAIP)

HAIP was launched in 2023 by the Japanese G7 Presidency. Immediately following the Hiroshima Summit, the relevant digital ministers met and agreed on a ‘Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework’. The framework contains two key elements: an agreement on International Guiding Principles and the adoption of an International Code of Conduct. The eleven guidelines are not legally binding. They constitute an appeal to the developers of AI systems. These include risk management, transparent disclosure of AI capabilities and notification of incidents. At the heart of HAIP is the reporting system, i.e. the Voluntary Code of Conduct. The annual reports, which are managed by the OECD, have proved useful.
However, an analysis by Brookings (January 2026)[29] also highlights weaknesses in the Code of Conduct. As it is a voluntary system, not all relevant AI developers feel obliged to report in accordance with the 11 guidelines . In this respect, the OECD annual reports are of only limited relevance. The so-called ‘Group of HAIP Friends’ is therefore tasked with carrying out outreach and developing a more nuanced reporting system that distinguishes between large AI companies and small and medium-sized AI enterprises.
The G7 HAIP process is only loosely linked to other AI initiatives. It is closely intertwined with the OECD, and the G7 countries are actively involved in the Bletchley Process. However, the G7 countries have so far avoided taking a stance on the UN process. There are also no links to Indian, African or Chinese initiatives.

AI summits as part of the so-called Bletchley Process

In November 2023, the then British Prime Minister Sunak launched an initiative to raise the global discussion on AI to a higher political level. He invited heads of state and government, as well as the CEOs of the world’s leading AI companies, to Bletchley for an ‘AI summit’. Bletchley is a suburb of London that gained fame during the Second World War as the place where the German Wehrmacht’s Enigma code was cracked. Among those who accepted Sunak’s invitation were US Vice-President Kamala Harris, French President Macron, German Chancellor Scholz, European Commission President von der Leyen, and numerous CEOs of leading AI companies, including Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg. The
Bletchley Deklaration[30] was signed by 28 countries, including the US, the EU, China and India. The document highlights both the opportunities and risks of AI: “AI should be designed, developed, deployed and used in a manner that is safe, human-centric, trustworthy and responsible”. It was agreed that the AI summit would be held annually in a different country in future.
The first follow-up meeting in 2024 in Seoul focused primarily on security issues. It was agreed in Seoul to establish a network of national AI safety institutes. At the 2025 meeting in Paris, President Macron faced opposition from the US for the first time. US Vice-President J.D. Vance criticised the European AI Act, called for freedom for AI innovation and opposed restrictions on US tech companies. At the 2026 meeting in New Delhi, India’s Prime Minister Modi focused on AI development in the Global South. The US signed the very general final declaration but avoided making any specific commitments. In his speech at the summit, White House Director Michael Kraitsos dismissed the UN’s AI dialogue as a “bureaucratic monster”. The Bletchley Summit will take place in Geneva in 2027 and in Abu Dhabi in 2028.

UN Independent Panel on AI and Global Dialogue on AI Governance

The UN has been addressing AI since the early 2020s. In 2023, a UN High-Level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence[31] was established, whose recommendations were incorporated into the Global Digital Compact (GDC). The GDC recommended the formation of an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and the organisation of an annual Global Dialogue on AI Governance.
UN Resolution 79/325 established the mandate of the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI.[32] It is broadly defined and modelled on the structure of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The Panel is required to produce an “annual report containing evidence-based scientific assessments relating to the opportunities, risks and impacts of artificial intelligence”, which is then to be discussed by the international community at the Global Dialogue on AI Governance.
In February 2026, the 40 members of the panel were appointed from over 2,600 applications. UJN Secretary-General Guterres expects the panel to provide “rigorous, independent scientific insight that enables all Member States, regardless of their technological capacity, to engage on an equal footing”.[33] The AI panel’s first meeting took place in Madrid in April 2026. There, Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez criticised the fact that the AI sector is dominated by five US-based AI corporations. He said he expected the AI Panel to make recommendations on how to overcome this “silent colonialism”.[34] The first AI Governance Dialogue is scheduled for 6 and 7 July 2026 in Geneva. The second dialogue will take place on the sidelines of the STI Forum in New York in June 2027. In autumn 2027, the GDC – and with it the panel and the dialogue – will be reviewed by the 82nd UN General Assembly. A decision will then be made on how to proceed with the AI panel and the dialogue on AI governance.

Global South: India, Saudi Arabia & Africa

In February 2026, India’s Prime Minister Modi used the Bletchley Summit to position the ‘Global South’ as an independent player in the global AI race. He defined AI as a global good that must not be dominated by a select few. “Some countries and companies believe AI is a ‘strategic asset’ and must be developed confidentially. But India thinks differently. We believe AI will benefit the world only when it is shared. When codes are open and shared, millions of young minds can make them safer and better. Therefore, let us resolve to develop AI as a global common good.“[35] According to India’s Digital Minister Krishnan, India, with its 1.4 billion inhabitants and its natural resources, has the potential for a “trillion-dollar digital economy”. With the “AI for India 2030 initiative”, launched in January 2024, India aims to establish itself internationally as a leading AI power.[36]
In the Arab world, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular have been investing in AI for years and are claiming a say in global discussions on AI governance. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is Chairman of the “Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA)“[37]. In 2025, more than US$10 billion was invested in AI. The country is a member of the OECD’s GPAI. In the Global AI Index 2025, Saudi Arabia ranked 14th. The UAE has a master plan for 2030 and aims to invest 100 billion in AI by then. On 26 June 2026, a new government agency, the “Artificial Intelligence and Data Authority” (AIDA)[38], was established. It reports directly to the Prime Minister and brings together various existing agencies that dealt with internet developments and digital policy. In 2025, AI was introduced as a compulsory subject in all schools.[39]
The African Union has launched several AI initiatives since the early 2020s. In April 2025, the first African AI Summit took place in Kigali.[40]. In Kigali, discussions focused primarily on the opportunity for Africa to achieve ‘AI leapfrogging’ – that is, skipping an entire generation of technology by investing in education for the younger generation and establishing data centres, which require significant amounts of water and energy, resources that are readily available in many African countries. “With proper investment in skills, digital literacy and innovation, Africa’s youthful, tech-savvy population can drive the continent towards a globally competitive, AI-powered future that meets local needs. Additionally, Africa’s abundant renewable energy resources offer a sustainable foundation for powering the data centres and digital infrastructure that will underpin this transformation.” The aim of the summit was to establish its own AI structures and avoid neo-colonial dependencies.
There are several AI initiatives in Africa. One of the first was Artificial Intelligence for Development (AI4D), founded as early as 2020, which is supported by, amongst others, development aid organisations from Sweden, Canada and the UK. The Africa AI Council[41], founded in February 2025 by the Smart Africa Alliance, with its 15 members, aims to lead Africa into an AI future in which the continent’s countries are not only ‘consumers’ but also ‘developers’. Despite the numerous initiatives, progress to date has been limited. In 2025, Africa accounted for just one per cent of global AI research. AI development in Africa is very unevenly distributed. Of the 170 data centres currently operating in Africa, half are located in just four countries: Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya.
The African Union is one of the strongest supporters of the UN AI process. The 40-member UN AI panel includes seven African representatives. AI development in Africa is also significantly influenced by the Sino-American AI race. China and the US are seeking to establish AI partnerships on the African continent. Under the Biden administration, the US adopted a specific ‘Digital Transformation With Africa’ (DTA) plan. Under this plan, the US intended to mobilise 800 million dollars for AI development in Africa, half of which was to come from private investment. However, in the Trump administration’s AI strategy ‘Winning the Race’, adopted in July 2025, Africa no longer plays a specific role. Nevertheless, many US companies – notably Nvidia, Google, IBM and Microsoft – are involved in AI development in Africa through substantial investments. Chinese AI companies, ranging from Alibaba and Huawei to DeepSeek and Qwen, have likewise been active on the African market for years. In September 2025, China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the African Union (AU) on AI development[42]. Many authoritarian African states are particularly interested in Chinese surveillance software.

China’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) and Russia’s plans

The proposal to establish a non-governmental international AI organisation, the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO), based in Shanghai, was presented during the 2025 World AI Conference in Shanghai. At the same time, Chinese President Xi Jiping had proposed an ‘Action Plan for Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance’[43], which, amongst other things, supports UN initiatives. However, the WAICO proposal was not elaborated upon in any further detail. Even a year after the idea was announced, details regarding its statutes, membership and mandate remain unclear. Nevertheless, the WAICO proposal has been repeatedly raised by China’s most senior representatives – including President Xi, Premier Li and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. At the summit between Russia and China (May 2026), President Vladimir Putin spoke in favour of a WAICO[44]. China has also sought to secure the support of third-party partners at other bilateral meetings, such as in the joint statement with Myanmar dated 17 June 2026.[45]
On 17 June 2026, the Chinese State Council Information Office published an AI White Paper[46] containing comprehensive proposals for international AI regulation. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who presented the white paper at a press conference, also called for an “improvement in the rules governing the Internet”. China supports the UN in fulfilling its role as the main channel for global AI governance and has pushed for the adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution on international cooperation on capacity-building in the field of AI. The White Paper refers to the WAICO proposal, strongly advocates the development of an open and open-source-based ecosystem, promotes the global exchange of technological achievements and practical experience, firmly rejects development models based on isolation, exclusion and technology monopolies, and focuses on establishing an open, inclusive and mutually beneficial framework for international AI cooperation.[47] Details are to be discussed at the 8th Chinese World Conference on Artificial Intelligence, scheduled to take place in Shanghai from 22 to 24 July 2026.[48]
Russia supports China’s international ambitions, such as the WAICO, but is focusing more on strengthening its own AI capabilities, independent of the West. The primary focus here is on AI applications in the military sector. On 30 June 2026, Defence Minister Andrei Belousov announced the implementation of a new AI-supported air defence system.[49] On 15 May 2026, the “Commission on the Development of AI Technologies”, established by President Putin in April 2026, held its first meeting in Moscow. The commission is chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Grigorenko and the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Maxim Oreshkin.[50] At the inaugural meeting, Putin said: “I want to emphasise once again that AI, along with digital platforms and autonomous systems, is shaping an entirely new landscape for the economy, public relations, the social sphere, education, healthcare, logistics and industry, as well as defence and security – in essence, for the life of the nation as a whole. The sovereignty of the Russian state in the near future – and, without exaggeration, its very existence – depends on our ability to keep pace with these global transformations“.[51] Russia supports the UN AI process and is represented on the UN AI Panel by Andrei Neznamov, Director of the AI Research Institute at Sberbank in Moscow. Due to Neznamov’s appointment, Ukraine voted against the UN resolution in February 2026 that had appointed the 40 members of the UN AI Panel.[52]

The encyclical ‘Magnifica Humanitas’ by Pope Leo XIV.

It remains to be seen to what extent the papal encyclical of 25 May 2026 will influence the global debate on AI governance. In the 38-page policy paper[53], however, the Pope addresses all the issues also being discussed in the UN dialogue on AI governance, within the OECD and at the Bletchley Process summits. The Pope highlights not only the opportunities but also the dangers of AI, and calls for binding democratic guidelines. He criticises big tech companies, warns against the use of AI in autonomous weapon systems and emphasises that machines must never be allowed to decide on matters of life and death. He criticises ‘digital colonialism’, calls for strict regulation of algorithms and opposes the reduction of human beings to mere producers of data. No one should be marginalised as a result of the digital transformation.

[1] https://meetings.unoda.org/-/global-mechanism-on-icts-in-the-context-of-international-security-plenary-2026

[2] https://meetings.unoda.org/ccw-/convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons-group-of-governmental-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-2026

[3] https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session62/advance-versions/a-hrc-62-33-auv-1-en.pdf

[4] https://www.internetsociety.org/events/un/plenipot-2026/

[5] https://www.eurodig.org/eurodig-2026/messages-from-brussels/

[6] https://www.intgovforum.org/en/filedepot_download/342/31315

[7] https://www.intgovforum.org/en/filedepot_download/342/31166?__cf_chl_f_tk=fOH4yWf0PQeJa032Az4RvnQR83evhkG38qWpxzVa0pA-1782920078-1.0.1.1-LmgJ_Jd.8LIEbK6NqwkaFLBSP1FekNTffpzOuYE70zY

[8] https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/ungis/

[9] https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/ungis/Home/MCG

[10] https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/ungis/Content/upload/doc/roadmaps/UNGIS_JIRM_WSIS%E2%80%93GDC_Coherence_DRAFT.pdf

[11] https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/ungis/Articles/View/2239

[12] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/promoting-advanced-artificial-intelligence-innovation-and-security/