Key IG topics in the 1st quarter of 2025
In the first quarter of 2025, the discussion on internet governance was dominated by the following five topics:
· Preparations for the 20th IGF in Oslo
· The WSIS+20 Review Conference
· Artificial intelligence (AI) and negotiations on the UN's new AI bodies
· The progress of the negotiations on cyber security
· The conflict between the US and the European Commission on digital policy
Internet Governance Forum
Preparations for the 20th UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Oslo (23-27 June 2025) got off to a swift start in the first quarter of 2025.[1] There were several virtual meetings of the newly formed Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) led by the Digital Minister of the Bahamas, Carol Roach, and the Leadership Panel (LP) led by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Maria Ressa and Vint Cerf, as well as the Norwegian host. [2]
The general theme for the Oslo IGF was defined as: Building Digital Governance Together. The sub-themes are: Digital Trust and Resilience; Sustainable and Responsible Innovation, Universal Access and Digital Rights and Digital Cooperation. The "Call for Proposals" for workshops resulted in over 500 suggestions. The proposals will be evaluated by the MAG. The program will be decided at the 2nd Open MAG Consultations from 14 to 16 April 2025 in Geneva. There will again be a "Parliamentarian Track" to which the UN Deputy Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) have invited together with the President of the Norwegian Parliament (Storting). [3]
The IGF's mandate ends on 31 December 2025, and it is up to the WSIS+20 Review Conference to decide how to proceed with the IGF. After the Global Digital Compact (GDC) recognised the IGF as "the primary multi-stakeholder platform for discussion of Internet governance issues" in Article 28 in September 2024, it is generally expected that the IGF mandate will be extended for another ten years . There are also proposals to make the IGF a permanent institution. However, no candidates have yet applied for 2026 and 2027.
The mandate of the IGF Leadership Panel (LP) also ends on 31 December 2025. Medium and long-term perspectives were discussed at two joint virtual meetings between the MAG and LP in February and March 2025. At the IGF in Oslo, the LP initiative "The IGF We Want"[4] and the document "The Internet We Want"[5] will be discussed in a plenary session.
· The proposal by LP Co-Chair Vint Cerf to give the IGF permanent status received broad support. A change to the mandate (Article 72 of the Tunis Agenda) was not necessary for this, but more stable staffing and material resources for the IGF Secretariat in Geneva were. Coordination with the GDC Follow Up is also necessary. If the IGF's mandate is extended, there must be a new appointment to the LP.
· Looking back, it has become clear that the decision in 2023 to establish a small steering group with just 15 people without executive power was the right one. It has given the IGF process new momentum and greater international visibility. The feared competition with the MAG has not materialised. On the contrary, productive cooperation has developed between the MAG and the LP. However, the LP's weakness is that some of the ten members appointed by UN Secretary-General Guterres only participate sporadically in the LP's work.
WSIS+20 Review Conference
On 25 March 2025 the 79th UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the modalities for the review conference of the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+20) with UN Resolution 79/277. The implementation of the WSIS Declaration of Principles and the WSIS Action Plan of Geneva (2003) and the Tunis Agenda (2005) will be evaluated.
According to UN Resolution 79/277, the evaluation process is to culminate in a two-day high-level intergovernmental conference on 16 and 17 December 2025 in New York. An "intergovernmental agreed outcome document" is to be adopted there. This is intended to set the course for the development of international digital policy for the next ten years (WSIS+30). The conference is to be prepared by an independent intergovernmental preparatory process within the framework of the 80th UN General Assembly (UNGA). This process will be led by two "co-facilitators" appointed by the President of the UNGA. The negotiations will be based on the UNCSTD report, which will be discussed at the 28th UNCTSD meeting in Geneva in April 2025 and to which the more than 30 UN organisations represented in the UNGIS (United Nations Group in the Information Society) have contributed. The " intergovernmental preparatory process" shall also take into account "input" from all relevant WSIS stakeholders. According to Article 3 of UN Resolution 79/277, non-governmental representatives are to have an appropriate say at the final conference in New York in December 2025.
Despite many discussions and proposals in the run-up to the adoption of UN Resolution 79/277, it remains unclear how the interaction between the negotiation process of governments and the activities of non-state stakeholders should be organised in practice. According to Article 5 of UN Resolution 79/277, it is the co-facilitators who shall lead the government negotiations through to the final document. Article 6, however, states that "informal interactive consultations with all relevant stakeholders" should take place. These are scheduled by the President of the UNGA. He is to collect "input" for the intergovernmental negotiations. However, it remains unclear how this "input" will be incorporated into the intergovernmental negotiations. It also remains unclear whether the co-facilitators are also obliged to hold multi-stakeholder consultations and whether non-governmental stakeholders have access to the intergovernmental negotiations.
· Over 100 NGOs made concrete proposals in a "Five-Point Plan for an Inclusive WSIS+20 Review[6] on March 26, 2026, on what interaction between governments and non-governmental stakeholders could look like. Stakeholders should be involved in the preparation of drafts of the WSIS+20 outcome document from the outset, there should be opportunities to comment on interim drafts throughout the negotiation process and all stakeholders must be represented at the high-level outcome conference in New York in December 2025. The "São Paulo Multistakeholder Guidelines" (SPMGs)[7] adopted by the NetMundial+10 conference in April 2024 contain widely recognised concrete procedures on how to organise effective cooperation between all stakeholders.
· The Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) had submitted four proposals for the WSIS+20 procedures already on 12 February 2025: 1. Preserve and enhance the multistakeholder model of digital policymaking by ensuring that all stakeholders have a meaningful voice in the WSIS+20 negotiations. 2. advocate for a long-term or permanent extension of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and strengthen its institutional capacity. 3. seek to have GDC implementation done within the WSIS ecosystem to avoid duplication. 4. reinforce that digital inclusion was at the heart of the WSIS and continues to be a priority as digital inequality persists."[8]
· The German IGF-D community also commented on the WSIS+20 process in a letter to the German UN Ambassador Leendertse dated 18 March 2025. This letter calls for the active participation of non-governmental stakeholders, the further development of the multi-stakeholder model and the extension of the IGF mandate. It proposes that WSIS+20 should link the future implementation of the eleven WSIS action lines more closely with the UN's 16 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
The extent to which the changed global situation will affect the WSIS+20 conference remains to be seen. It is to be expected that WSIS+20 will reflect the new geopolitical controversies.
· In addition to efforts to overcome the digital divide and greater financial commitment to the expansion of digital infrastructure, the "global South" will demand greater participation in the data economy and the development of AI. At a BRICS expert seminar on 18 March 2025, for example Brazilian Digital Minister Luis Felipe Giesteira postulated that it was unacceptable for developing countries to become suppliers of raw data while the services based on this data are developed by Western countries.[9] This topic is already on the agenda of the UNCSTD Working Group on Data Governance, which was newly founded by the GDC and will begin its work in Geneva in April 2025. It will have a lasting impact on WSIS+20. [10]
· The role of the USA is also unclear. In a discussion at ECOSOC in New York on the Day of Peaceful Coexistence on 5 March 2025, Edward Heartney, diplomat at the US UN Embassy, made a remarkably negative statement on the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): "The SDGs advance a program of soft global governance that is inconsistent with U.S. sovereignty and adverse to the rights and interests of Americans. In the last U.S. election, the mandate from the American people was clear: the government of the United States must refocus on the interests of Americans. We must care first and foremost for our own – that is our moral and civic duty. President Trump also set a clear and overdue course correction on “gender” and climate ideology, which pervade the SDGs. Put simply, globalist endeavors like Agenda 2030 and the SDGs lost at the ballot box. Therefore, the United States rejects and denounces the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development."[11] What this means for WSIS+20, which is, among other things, about linking the WSIS action lines with the SDGs, is unclear.
· Russia may raise the issue of state control of the internet at WSIS+20. In UN Resolution 79/194 "ICT for Development" of 29 December 2024, the formula of "Enhanced Cooperation", which has been controversial since the Tunis Agenda of 2005, has reappeared. In Tunis, this ambiguous formulation was used to bridge the dissent over the creation of an intergovernmental organisation for the Internet. The two "UNCSTD Working Groups on Enhanced Cooperation" (WGEC), which dealt with this between 2014 and 2019, did not yield any result. In recent years, Russia has attempted to launch corresponding proposals via an ITU Council Working Group (CWG-Internet), which also failed. Russia's bid to host the IGF in St. Petersburg in 2025 neither was successful. It would not be surprising if Russia were to use the WSIS+20 negotiations as an opportunity, for example, to tie its demand for a Governmental Oversight Committee (GOC) via ICANN to an extension of the IGF mandate.
· China has kept a low profile in the controversial discussions on global digital policy in recent years and has distinguished itself as a supporter of the global South. China has shown little interest in establishing a new intergovernmental UN Internet body. The Cyber Administration of China (CAC), which reports directly to Chinese President Xi Jinping, has been constructively involved in the last IGFs with its own workshops. In September 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang submitted a "Global Data Security Initiative[12] to the UN, which has so far had no impact. At the 78th UN General Assembly, China introduced an AI resolution on "AI Capacity Building" in developing countries[13] (UN Resolution 78/311 of July 5, 2024), which received great support, including from the USA.[14]
Artificial intelligence
The debate on artificial intelligence continued at various levels in the first quarter of 2025. The most important venues were the AI summit in Paris (February 2025) and the negotiations starting in New York to implement the resolutions of the Global Digital Compact (GDC) for an "International Scientific Panel on AI" and a "Global Dialogue on AI Governance" under the umbrella of the UN. The topic is also increasingly being discussed at high-level political conferences such as the Davos World Economic Forum (January 2025) and the Munich Security Conference (February 2025).
The AI summit in Paris (11 and 12 February 2025) was the third AI summit of the so-called "Bletchley Process" launched by the British government in 2023 to establish a high-level AI dialog between governments and AI companies. A second AI summit was held in Seoul in 2024, which focused on AI safety. The concept of national and regional "AI Safety Institutes" was developed there.
· The Paris AI Summit, which was opened by French President Emanuel Macron, was attended by over 1,000 experts from more than 100 countries, including US Vice President J.D. Vance, India's Prime Minister Modi and EU Commission President von der Leyen. The topics "AI and energy" and "AI and the labor market" were discussed for the first time.
· 61 governments signed a "Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable Artificial Intelligence for People and the Planet".[15] The statement strengthens the multi-stakeholder model for AI governance, welcomes the expansion of the "AI Safety Institutes" adopted at the 2nd AI Summit in Korea and supports the UN initiatives for a global AI dialog and an international AI panel, but otherwise falls short of the summit declarations of London (2023) and Seoul (2024) in its generality.
· The statement was signed by all EU states, many developing countries and China. The USA and the UK did not sign the document.[16] On the eve of the Paris AI summit, US President Trump overruled the executive order (EO) on AI of his predecessor Joe Biden and announced that American AI companies would not be subject to any restrictions. In his Paris speech, US Vice President J.D. Vance praised US AI as the "golden standard" for the world and sharply criticised European AI legislation: "The US will ensure that US AI technology continues to be the gold standard worldwide and we are the partner of choice for others, as they expand their own use of AI. We believe that excessive regulation of the AI could kill a transformative industry just as it's taking off. And we feel strongly that AI must remain free from ideological bias. American AI will not be co-opted into a tool for authoritarian censorship[17]
· 10 countries (Chile, Finland, France, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Slovenia, Switzerland, Germany and India) separately signed a "Paris Charter on Artificial Intelligence in the Public Interest"[18] and founded a new "Public Interest AI Platform" (PIAP). The Paris Charter refers to the uneven distribution of AI capacities in the world and the risk of a new "AI Divide". It identifies the risks of misuse of AI and the dangers of market concentration. "The benefits of AI in the public interest rely on building open public goods and infrastructure, providing an alternative to existing market concentration." The new PIAP platform is intended to better coordinate the many AI initiatives that have become confusing and involve more developing countries in the discussion through capacity building and the exchange of best practice. It remains unclear how this new PIAP initiative will be coordinated with the OECD Global Partnership on AI (GPAI). [19]
Negotiations on the creation of the two new UN AI bodies adopted by the GDC - the "International Scientific Panel on AI" and the "Global Dialogue on AI Governance" - began with several government and stakeholder consultations on the mandate, structures and work plans.
· In an "Elements Paper" dated 28 February 2025, the initial outline for both institutions was summarised. The AI Panel should be "independent, multidisciplinary and global", the AI Dialogue should be both "multistakeholder" and "multilateral" and use synergies with other initiatives.
· Based on the February consultations, the co-coordinators (Costa Rica & Spain) presented a zero draft on 18 March 2025, which already describes the elements of the two new institutions more precisely
o The AI Panel is to consist of an "Expert Committee" (20 members), appointed by the UN Secretary-General, and an "Advisory Committee" (40 members), elected by the UN General Assembly. In addition to individual studies on various special topics, the AI Panel is to draw up an annual "AI World Report".
o The AI Dialogue is to take place in conjunction with a UN organisation (ITU, UNESCO, IGF). The first AI Dialogue is planned for September 2025 in New York, the second for 2026 in Geneva.
At academic and political conferences on AI, it is noticeable that the role of artificial intelligence in the military domain is increasingly coming into focus. AI negotiations between governments, e.g. at UNESCO, in the Council of Europe, in the EU, in the OECD or in the Bletchley Process, have explicitly excluded the military dimension. Military aspects have been negotiated separately in the GGE LAWS since 2012 and in the UN General Assembly since 2023. In view of developments in current wars, this separation appears to be becoming obsolete.
· The Dutch government has set up a Global Commission on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (GC REAIM) via the Center for Strategic Studies (HSSC) in The Hague[20] with the mandate "to help promote mutual awareness and understanding among the many communities working on issues related to the global governance of AI in the military domain." The Chairman is the former Korean Foreign Minister Byung-se Yun. The GC REAIM has 19 members and 31 advisors from 35 countries, including some former generals. A final report is due in summer 2026.
· As part of the Munich Security Conference, a "Munich Cyber Security Conference" (MCSC) has developed as an independent conference, at which the military use of AI, e.g. in the Ukraine war, played a major role in February 2025. [21]
· On 3 March 2025, the World Economic Forum in Davos (WEF) published a report entitled "AI red lines: the opportunities and challenges of setting limits"[22] which advocates "red lines" in the development of AI. "Behavioral red lines are necessary to ensure AI remains in accordance with societal norms. Red lines govern both harmful uses of AI by humans and harmful autonomous behavior by AI systems". Autonomous weapons and drones were already discussed at the WEF in Davos in January 2025. A WEF report "AI in Action: Beyond Experimentation to Transform Industry[23] provided a new approach. However, the "WEF AI Governance Alliance"[24] founded in 2023 has not yet addressed military aspects.
· The Oxford Internet Institute (OII) organised a workshop on military AI in February 2025 to mark the publication of the book "The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Defence" by Mariarosaria Taddeo. [25]
· UNIDIR, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva, has presented several publications on the military dimension of AI in recent months[26] and organised a high-level expert conference in Geneva on 30 and 31 March 2025. [27]
Cybersecurity
In the area of cyber security, the penultimate meeting of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) in New York and the spring meeting of the Group of Experts on Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE LAWS) in Geneva were of particular importance in the first quarter of 2025. It was announced that the signing ceremony for the UN Convention against Cybercrime, which was adopted by the 79th UN General Assembly in December 2024, will take place in Hanoi in July 2025.
The 10th OEWG meeting (10 to 17 February 2025) focused primarily on the further establishment of the Point of Contact mechanism (POC), the so-called "red phone" for cyber attacks, as well as the transformation of the OEWG into a permanent UN institution. The inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders in the OEWG's work was again discussed. The last session of the OEWG will take place from 7 to 11 July 2025 in New York. The OEWG final report will then be submitted to the 1st Committee of the 80th UNGA. This must decide on the UN's further course of action in the area of cybersecurity. The OEWG mandate ends on 31 December 2025.
· Substantial progress was made with the POC mechanism. In March 2025, there were several practical tests (simulation exercises) on the functionality of the new mechanism. The test was carried out in collaboration with UNODA, UNIDIR and ITU. It involved 130 POCs from more than 80 countries.[28] On 28 March 2025, a draft "Template for Communication" was published, which is to serve as a guideline for the new POCs to be established. [29]
· The discussion on the creation of a "Permanent UN Cybersecurity Mechanism" has not yet led to a clear proposal. It remains to be seen whether this new mechanism should become a traditional UN committee, comparable to the UN Committee on Outer Space, or more of an action program that deals with the implementation of the eleven principles agreed in 2015 for responsible conduct by states in cyberspace. The focus of the content is also unclear. Four "Dedicated Thematic Groups" on the protection of critical infrastructure, confidence-building measures, the application of international law in cyberspace and cyber capacity building are under discussion. [30]
· The question of how non-governmental stakeholders will be involved in the future work of the permanent mechanism remains controversial. In February 2025, Canada and Chile, supported by 27 countries, made a detailed proposal that is fundamentally in favor of an opening. The paper states: "States recognize the valuable contributions of the multistakeholder community in multilateral cybersecurity discussions, especially considering their unique expertise and the technical reality of cyberspace. The multistakeholder community, including academia, civil society, the private sector, and the technical community are invited to meaningfully contribute within the future UN mechanism on cybersecurity.[31]
At the GGE LAWS (3 to 7 March 2025 in Geneva), progress was made for the first time in years. There is still no consensus on the rolling text, which outlines elements of a possible agreement in five chapters. However, an agreed text has been published for three of the "Five Boxes".[32] However, the Chair of the GGE LAWS, Robert in den Bosch from the Netherlands, expressed optimism that he would be able to present results on the key issues – the definition of autonomous weapon systems (AWS), the implementation of human control and the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) when using AWS – by the fall meeting in September 2025. UN Secretary-General Guterres is pushing for the conclusion of an international treaty in 2026.
Controversial digital policy: USA vs. European Union
After US President Trump took office on 21 January 2025, the controversies between the US and the European Union in the area of digital policy have intensified. Trump sees the "Digital Rulebook" (DSA, DMA, AI Act, DGA, NIS2, Data Act, etc.) drawn up by the EU over the last five years as an unacceptable hindrance to American tech companies and is threatening countermeasures. The EU is unimpressed by these threats and continues to implement the numerous digital laws, including the warning procedures against US digital companies. The future of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which was founded three years ago, is unclear[33] . The TTC was intended to promote "compatible standards and regulations based on shared democratic values". It is also unclear whether the USA will continue to participate in the implementation of the OECD/G20 agreement for a global digital tax (BEPS Pillar Two). [34]
The USA has made its new international digital strategy clear on two occasions in particular: firstly, in the speeches by US Vice President J.D. Vance at the AI summit in Paris and at the Munich Security Conference. Both resulted in frontal attacks on European digital legislation. Secondly, in the memorandum "Defending American Companies and Innovators from Overseas Extortion and unfair Fines and Penalties" from 21 February 2025, where US President Donald Trump called for action against the fines proceedings initiated by the European Commission against US tech companies.
· In his speech at the AI Summit Paris on 12 February 2025, J.D. Vance said: "The Trump Administration is troubled by reports that some foreign governments are considering tightening the screws on U.S. tech companies with international footprints. Now, America cannot and will not accept that, and we think it's a terrible mistake. The U.S. innovators of all sizes already know what it's like to deal with onerous international rules. Many of our most productive tech companies are forced to deal with the EU's DSA and the massive regulations it created about taking down content and policing so-called misinformation. For smaller firms, navigating the GDPR means paying endless legal compliance costs or otherwise risking massive fines. The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety. It will be won by building the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future".[35] J.D. Vance also attacked the DSA at the Munich Security Conference (15 February 2025): "I look to Brussels, where EU commissars warn citizens that they intend to shut down social media during times of civil unrest the moment they spot what they’ve judged to be, quote, “hateful content”, suspected of posting anti-feminist comments online."[36]
· On 21 February 2025, US President Donald Trump signed a memorandum entitled "Defending American Companies and Innovators from Extortion and Unwarranted Fines and Penalties Overseas". Among other things, the memorandum requires the US Department of Commerce (DOC) and the US Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate the extent to which regulations of other countries restrict the freedoms of American internet companies - i.e. Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, X, Open AI & Co. - and how the USA should take action against them. The text states: "Rather than empowering their own workers and economies, foreign governments have increasingly exercised extraterritorial powers over US companies in the technology sector, hindering the success of these companies and appropriating revenue that should be contributing to our nation's well-being, not theirs," the document says. America's tech companies are being plundered by the EU. "Foreign governments will be held accountable if they take steps to force US companies to hand over their intellectual property. Regulations that dictate how US companies interact with consumers in the EU, such as the DMA and DSA, will be scrutinized by the government." Such measures, Trump says, "violate American sovereignty and move our jobs overseas, limit the global competitiveness of U.S. companies, and increase operating costs while exposing our sensitive information to potentially hostile foreign regulators." He adds, "My administration will not allow U.S. companies to prop up failing foreign economies through extortionate fines and taxes. America's economy will not be a source of revenue for countries that have failed to cultivate their own economic success."
The European Commission has reacted calmly to the US threats. At the Munich Security Conference on 15 February 2025, EU Vice-President Henna Virkkunen, who is responsible for digital policy, said that the de-regulation of the digital sector called for by US Vice-President J.D. Vance was not an option for the EU. At best, they could talk about "regulatory simplification".
· Against the backdrop of Marc Zuckerberg's announcement that Meta will suspend so-called "content moderation" following Donald Trump's election victory, the European Parliament discussed the future of the Digital Service Act (DSA) on 23 January 2025. EU Vice-President Henna Virkkunen's announcement that she would not give in to pressure from US companies was met with support. "What good is it to have laws if we don't have the courage to apply them?" asked French MEP Glucksmann.[37] And Dutch MEP van Sparrentak argued: "A true free internet is one where not a small bunch of tech oligarchs, but our democratic institutions make the rules. In the current geopolitical context we cannot afford to be naive. The EU needs to stand strong and stand up for democracy online and offline. The push for deregulation in tech led by Trump and his friends will no longer bring us freedom and democracy, but further plummet us into a tech oligarchy"[38] . Virkkunen announced new proceedings against X, Facebook and TikTok, plans to increase the number of staff at her agency and present a progress report to parliament in November 2025.
· On 13 February 2025, the European Digital Services Council approved the integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation ([39] ) into the DSA. This makes the Code the legally binding benchmark for platforms' compliance with the DSA. The list of Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPS) and Very Large Search Engines (VLOSE) was updated by the EU Commission on 6 February 2025. The list contains 20 companies, including AliExpress and TikTok from China, Meta, Google, Amazon, Apple and Twitter from the USA, as well as Booking.com, LinkedIn, Wikimedia and Germany-based Zalando.[40] VLOPS and VLOSEs are required to report to the EU Commission. On 19 March 2025, the EU Commission sent Alphabet two so-called "Preliminary Findings" and drew attention to violations of the DSA by "Google Play" and "Google Search". [41] Apple was reprimanded for violations of the DMA due to a lack of interoperability. [42]
· Work on the "Code of Practice for General-Purpose AI"[43] , a guideline for the application of EU AI law, is also continuing unabated. The third draft was presented for discussion on 25 March 2025. The first two sections describe the transparency and copyright obligations in detail, with exemptions for providers of certain open source models in line with the AI Act. The third section is only relevant for a small number of providers of the most advanced AI models that could pose systemic risks according to the classification criteria in Article 51 of the AI Act. Here, the Code outlines measures to assess and mitigate systemic risk, including model assessments, incident reporting and cybersecurity obligations. The code is expected to be ready for adoption by May 2025. [44]
· In order to be less dependent on US tech companies, the EU is diversifying its international digital policy. In the first quarter, this related in particular to the expansion of relations with India and South Africa
o The second meeting of the EU-India Trade and Technology Council took place in New Delhi on 28 February 2025. As a result, far-reaching AI cooperation was agreed. Three working groups will deepen projects on Strategic Technologies, Digital Governance, and Digital Connectivity; Clean and Green Technologies; and Trade, Investment and Resilient Value Chains. Both sides also agreed to work more closely together on internet governance and support the multi-stakeholder model: "Both sides agreed to collaborate on the implementation of the Global Digital Compact. ...They noted the need to ensure that the forthcoming WSIS+20 maintains global support for and enhances the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance[45]
o On 13 March 2025, an EU-South Africa summit was held in Cape Town under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. In the final declaration, close cooperation was agreed on AI, the implementation of the GDC and other digital topics. "We recognized the impact of rapid technological change from emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), which presents both opportunities and threats. We agreed to work together to promote international cooperation, including under the auspices of the United Nations, for an international governance framework for AI. In line with our shared commitment to the Global Digital Compact, we agreed to support developing countries to close the digital gap, and equitably share its benefits, and mitigate risks, including those related to data protection, intellectual property, privacy, and security.[46]
[1] https://www.intgovforum.org/en
[2] https://www.igf2025.no/
[3] https://intgovforum.org/en/filedepot_download/340/28941
[4] https://theigfwewant.net/
[5] https://intgovforum.org/en/filedepot_download/263/28629
[6] https://www.gp-digital.org/five-point-plan-for-an-inclusive-wsis20-review/
[7] https://netmundial.br/pdf/NETmundial10-MultistakeholderStatement-2024.pdf
[8] https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/foc-advisory-network-proactive-advice-wsis20/
[9] https://brics.br/pt-br/brasil-realiza-webinar-sobre-a-importancia-da-economia-de-dados-para-os-paises-do-brics
[10] https://unctad.org/topic/commission-on-science-and-technology-for-development/working-group-on-data-governance
[11] https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-the-un-meeting-entitled-58th-plenary-meeting-of-the-general-assembly/
[12] https://merics.org/en/comment/chinas-global-initiative-data-security-has-message-europe
13 https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202409/t20240904_11484762.html#:~:text=The%20resolution%20calls%20on%20all,call%20from%20the%20international%20community. [13]
[14] https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/78/311
[15] https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2025/02/11/statement-on-inclusive-and-sustainable-artificial-intelligence-for-people-and-the-planet
[16] https://www.techpolicy.press/paris-just-hosted-a-major-ai-summit-it-biggest-debate-was-a-trap/
[17] https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-vice-president-the-artificial-intelligence-action-summit-paris-france
[18] https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2025/02/11/the-paris-charter-on-artificial-intelligence-in-the-public-interest
[19] https://oecd.ai/en/
[20] https://hcss.nl/gcreaim/
[21] https://mcsc.io/mcsc-2025/
[22] https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/ai-red-lines-uses-behaviours/?utm_source=sfmc&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2848026_ForumStories-
[23] https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AI_in_Action_Beyond_Experimentation_to_Transform_Industry_2025.pdf
[24] https://initiatives.weforum.org/ai-governance-alliance/home
[25] https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news-events/the-ethics-of-artificial-intelligence-in-defence/
[26] https://unidir.org/publication/ai-military-domain-briefing-note-states/; https://unidir.org/publication/the-interpretation-and-application-of-international-humanitarian-law-in-relation-to-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/; https://unidir.org/publication/governance-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-military-domain-a-multi-stakeholder-perspective-on-priority-areas/
[27] https://unidir.org/event/global-conference-on-ai-security-and-ethics-2025/
[28] https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/Letter_from_OEWG_Chair_5_March_2025.pdf
[29] https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/POC_comms_template_April_2025-FINAL.pdf
[30] https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/Letter_from_OEWG_Chair_4_April_2025.pdf
[31] https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/Cross_Regional_Paper_-_Practical_Modalities_to_Enable_Meaningful_Stakeholder_Participation_in_the_Future_UN_Mechanism_on_Cybersecurity_-_Feb_2025.pdf
[32] https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2025/gge/documents/rolling-text-5March.pdf and https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2025/gge/documents/rolling-text-6March.pdf
[33] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trade-and-technology-council
[34] https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/global-minimum-tax/global-anti-base-erosion-model-rules-pillar-two.html
[35] https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-vice-president-the-artificial-intelligence-action-summit-paris-france
[36] https://singjupost.com/full-transcript-vp-jd-vance-remarks-at-the-munich-security-conference/?singlepage=1
[37] https://www.tageblatt.lu/headlines/mit-dem-gesetz-fuer-digitale-dienste-die-demokratie-schuetzen/
[38] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/vod.html?mode=unit&vodLanguage=EN&internalEPId=2017011054638&providerMeetingId=32d5603c-7c63-4e37-ac08-08dd0e0f3eb2#
[39] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_505
[40] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/de/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses
[41] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_811
[42] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_816
[43] https://ccianet.org/articles/ai-act-implementation-code-of-practice-for-general-purpose-ai/
[44] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-code-practice
[45] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_643
[46] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_773
